The 10 day classified HUMINT-CI tradecraft Course (Reserves) is a hybrid course that combines HUMINT and counterintelligence concepts, procedures and. Apr 5, Intelligence Tradecraft Topics: Surveillance & Counter Surveillance Acquiring Human Intelligence Agnor, Francis. “The Interpreter as an Agent. Oct 2, As a former HUMINT collector, I am no stranger to the mocking cries of Instead, they need to find creative tradecraft solutions to our modern.
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It applies to clandestine operations for espionage, and for a clandestine phase prior to direct action DA or unconventional warfare UW.
Tradecraft – Wikipedia
Many of the techniques here are important in counterintelligence. Defensive counterintelligence personnel need to know them to recognize espionage, sabotage, etc. Offensive counterintelligence specialists may actually use them against foreign intelligence services FIS.
While DA and UW can be conducted by national military or paramilitary organizations, al-Qaeda and similar non-state militant groups appear to use considerably rtadecraft clandestine cell system structure, for command, control, and operations, than do national forces.
Cell systems are evolving to more decentralized models, sometimes because they are enabled by new forms of electronic communications. This page deals primarily with one’s own assets. See double agent for additional information adversary sources that a country has turned to its own side.
This description is based around the foreign intelligence service, of country Boperating in tardecraft against country A. tradecaft
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It may also include operations against non-state organizations operating in country Bwith or without country B support. It may also involve offensive counterintelligence against country D assets operating in country B. The basic structure here can be pertinent to a domestic service operating against a non-national group within its borders. Depending on the legal structure of the country, there may be significant, or very few, restrictions on domestic HUMINT. The most basic question will be whether criminal prosecution, or stopping operations, is the goal.
Typically, criminal prosecution will be the primary goal against drug and slavery groups, with breaking up their operations the secondary goal. These priorities, however, are apt to reverse in dealing with terrorist groups.
If there are separate organizations with diplomatic and nonofficial cover, there may be two chiefs. Sufficiently large stations may have several independent, compartmented groups. Nations vary as to how well hidden they choose to have all, part, or none of their intelligence personnel under the guise of diplomatic immunity. Frequently, at least one individual is known to the host country, so there can be a deniable channel of communications. If the nations are allies, many of the intelligence personnel may be known and actively cooperating.
Certain diplomatic titles were often assumed to be cover jobs. With the United Kingdom, ” passport control officer ” was, much of the time, an intelligence position. An intermediate approach has the officers clearly working for their country, but without diplomatic immunity and with a cover role that does not immediately suggest intelligence affiliation. For example, the Soviet GRU covered some intelligence officers under the TASS news agency, or as part of a trade or technical mission, or even as diplomats.
The last might seem surprising, but this was under a GRU assumption that military attaches would always be assumed to be intelligence officers, but that members of the civilian part of an embassy might actually be diplomats rather than intelligence officers. It was easier, of course, for the socialist USSR to assign people to state agencies. Western sensitivities tend to be much greater about using, for example, journalistic cover [ citation needed ]. The US has been emphatic in prohibiting any relationship between intelligence and the Peace Corps [ citation needed ].
An example of civilian cover for an American officer involved a German refugee, with the pseudonym “Stephan Haller”, who had widely ranging interests and special skills in mathematics and physics, as well as native language skill. His overt role, inwas directing a program that paid subsidies to German scientists, part of a larger program of denying German talent to the Soviets.
Initially, he was based in PforzheimWest Germany. During two years in Pforzheim, with a well-established cover, he collected political and scientific intelligence from the scientists, and also Germans that he knew in political circles before emigrating. Inhe moved to Berlindirecting overall “operations against scientific targets in the East Zone of Germany”, while still managing the subsidy program.
His new work included encouraging defection of key craftsmen working for the Soviets. He was considered a master craftsman. He did not grow careless or conceited with success.
Here remained a meticulous craftsman. Before he debriefed a source, he mastered the subject to be discussed. His agents were made comfortable not only by his cigars and beer but also by the easy flow of communication.
And he did not end until he had every last scrap of useful information. He never failed, moreover, to remain alert for operational leads– potential agentshhmint indicatorstradecragt possibilities. Huminf Haller was finished, there were no more questions to be asked.
And though he groaned over the chore of putting it on paper, his reporting became thorough-and more than thorough, illuminating-for he rarely failed to make interpretive comments. According to Victor Suvorovthe Soviet reaction to losing hummint operated from diplomatic missions, after the countries in which those embassies were overrun in the Second World War, was to emphasize “illegal” i. The illegal residencies were preferred to be in safe locations, tradeecraft of allies such as the United States, Great Britain and Canada.
Soviet operations were tightly compartmentalized, with strict need-to-know an absolute rule. All operations in tradecratt of illegals are worked out in tradwcraft a way that the officers of the GRU undercover residency do not have one crumb of information which is not necessary.
Operations are planned in such a way that there is no possibility of the illegals becoming dependent on the actions of the undercover residency. Suvorov explained that new agents were separated from official Soviet tradedraft only after the agent has compromised himself by giving Soviet Intelligence a significant quantity of secret material; making it impossible for the agent to go to the police.
The separated agent then occupies one of three guises: Greatest resources are devoted to these agents; which provide the most important material. Once the central headquarters assesses the materials as sufficiently valuable, the doctrine is to temporarily stop obtaining new material from the agent and improve their security as well as their knowledge of espionage tradecraft. This training is preferably done in a third country, from which the agent might or might not be moved to the Soviet Union.
Typical cover for an hmint absence would be taking a vacation or holiday. Thence he will go back to his own country, but as an independently acting agent. He will be run exclusively by the Centre, in concrete terms the head of a section, even, in special cases, the head of a directorate and in extreme cases the deputy head of the GRU or the head himself.
The running of such an agent is thus carried out exactly as the running of illegals is. Less valuable than a separated acting agent but still of importance, was the agent group, which migrated from diplomatic or civilian contact, to the tardecraft illegal rezidentura resident and infrastructureto direct communications with the Center.
The leader of such a group is called, in Soviet terminology, a gropovodand is conceptually the only member of the group that communicates with Moscow. In reality, clandestine communications personnel may be aware of the direct contact, but newer electronics allow the leader to manage his or her only communications.
Suvorov makes the important point that “A group automatically organises itself. Tgadecraft GRU obviously considers family groups containing the head of the family and his wife and children to be more secure and stable.
The members of such a group may work in completely different fields of espionage.
Traddcraft agents recruited by residencies rradecraft gradually organised into agent groups of three to five hummint each. Usually, agents working in one particular field of espionage are put together in one group. Sometimes a traxecraft consists of agents who for various reasons are known to each other. Let us suppose that one agent recruits two others. Thus to a certain extent the members of agent groups are completely isolated from Soviet diplomatic representation.
The agent group is in contact with the undercover residency for a period of time, then gradually the system of contact with the residency comes to an end and orders begin to be received directly from Moscow. By various channels the group sends it material tradecfaft to Moscow.
Finally the contact with Moscow becomes permanent and stable and the agent group is entirely separated from the residency. With gradual changes in personnel at the residency, like the resident himself, the cipher officers and the operational officers with whom there was once direct contact, nobody outside the Centre will know of the existence of this particular group.
Should it happen that operating conditions become difficult, or that the embassy is blockaded or closed down, the group will be able to continue its activities in the same way as before. When the GRU attaches one or more illegals i. This process of increasing the numbers and the gradual self-generation of independent organisations continues endlessly.
The GRU kept certain officers immediately ready to go into illegal status, should the host nation intensify security. These officers are in possession of previously prepared documents and equipment, and gold, diamonds and other valuables which will be of use to them in their illegal activities will have been hidden in secret hiding-places beforehand. In case of war actually breaking out, these officers rradecraft unobtrusively disappear from their embassies.
The Soviet government will register a protest and will for a short time refuse to exchange its diplomats for the diplomats of the aggressive country. Then it will capitulate, the exchange will take place and the newly fledged illegals will remain behind humknt safe houses and flats.
Afterwards they will gradually, by using the system of secret rendezvous, begin to establish the system of contacts with agents and agent groups which have recently been subordinated to the undercover residency.
Now they all form a new illegal residency. The new illegals never mix and never enter into contact with the old ones who have been working in trwdecraft country for a long time.
This plainly makes life more secure for both parties. Again, Suvorov emphasizes that the process of forming new illegal residencies was the Soviet doctrine for imposing compartmentation. Humont countries, especially those in danger of invasion, have a related approach, the stay-behind network.
Agent or agent organization established in a given country to be activated in the event of hostile overrun or other circumstances under which normal access would be denied. In such an approach, both clandestine intelligence and covert operations personnel live normal lives, perhaps carrying out regular military or government functions, but have prepared documentation of assumed identities, safehouses, secure communications, etc.
Seminar in Tradecraft and HumInt
Key assets for whom he was the case officer included Lona Cohen and Morris Cohenwho were not direct intelligence collectors but couriers for a number of agents reporting on US nuclear information, including Julius RosenbergEthel RosenbergDavid Greenglassand Klaus Fuchs. His role was that of the “illegal” resident in the US, under nonofficial cover.
Soviet practice often was to have two rezidentsone illegal and one a diplomat under official cover.
Unless a clandestine station has a strong cover identity, the larger the station, the larger the possibility it may be detected by counterintelligence organizations. Beyond the station chief, the most likely person jumint be associated with the station, not as a case officer, is a communicator, especially if highly specialized secure communication methods are used.
Some clandestine services may have additional capabilities for operations or support. Key operational agents of influence are apt to be run as singletons, although political considerations tradefraft require communication through cutouts.
Useful idiots can be run by diplomatic case officers, since there is no particular secrecy about their existence or loyalty. Valuable volunteers, depending humunt the size of the volunteer group, may work either with case officers, or operations officers brought clandestinely into the area of operations. Proprietaries, which can be large businesses e.